Friday, September 12, 2008. The Union home ministry approves a proposal to set up a new commando force to fight Naxals. The plan is to recruit and train some 10,000 personnel into an elite force that could infiltrate Maoist territories in small groups. Home minister P. Chidambaram handpicks K. Durga Prasad, the man credited with the success of the Greyhounds, the commando force that crushed Naxals in Andhra Pradesh, to head the force, christened Cobra (the Commando Battalions for Resolute Action). It is part of the Central Reserve Police Force.
The commandos are trained in the art of camouflage and jungle warfare. To dispel their fear of the jungle, they are taught how to catch and eat snakes. The nerve centre of commandos is set up in Delhi, where Prasad and his team monitors every battalion posted in Naxal-affected states. Within the security establishment, great fanfare greets the new special force.
Nearly six years later, the home ministry's own assessment says Cobra is making little progress in its mission. “The elite force was our best hope to combat insurgency in Naxal areas,” said a senior ministry official who was part of the team that founded the Cobra. “But, somehow, the whole idea behind raising a special force is not working.”
Cobra has become ineffective largely because of the lack of cooperation from states and the overall failure of the operations of the CRPF in the red corridor, which covers more than a quarter of India's land mass. Insurgency-hit states like Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have suffered maximum casualties. Naxals launch attacks almost every day, blowing up schools and government buildings, and killing police and paramilitary personnel and civilians.
Despite their munitions and numbers, Cobra commandos have not been able to curb the violence. Every Cobra battalion (around 1,000 personnel) has 35 men for intelligence gathering. Yet, the intelligence network of the force remains poor. The number of arrests and weapon recoveries has declined. Worse, there has been a steady weakening in the will of the commandos to tackle the Naxal problem.
Data from the home ministry shows that at least one security personnel loses his life to Maoists every three days. Since 2008, Naxals have killed 1,204 security officers and 1,169 police informers—figures that surpass the casualties in insurgency-affected Jammu and Kashmir in the same period.
The Cobras have lost 27 commandos in different operations. Some key reforms, including plans for auxiliary training schools, conceived by then CRPF director-general K. Vijay Kumar, have been abandoned. At least eight of 16 auxiliary training schools in the country were shut down last year.
Even as Naxals become more lethal in Chhattisgarh, home ministry data shows that Naxal activities in Jharkhand are at an all-time high. Today, more lives are lost in Naxal violence in Jharkhand than in Chhattisgarh. In the past two years alone, there have been 863 Naxal attacks in Jharkhand. As many as 254 civilians, 59 security personnel and 19 Naxals have been killed.
In its first detailed assessment of the Cobra's effectiveness, the CRPF top brass made a grim review. “The elite force is not up to mark,” reads an internal assessment report of the home ministry, a copy of which is with THE WEEK. “Sector commanders should make an analysis of the performance of the Cobra and need to be more attentive to the deficiencies. The standard operating procedure has to be revisited so that we have a clear vision of the role for the Cobra.” Inspector-General V.S. Yadav, who heads the force, declined to comment.
To some extent, what has complicated Cobra operations is the lack of something as basic as telecommunication facilities. The home ministry is miffed with the department of telecom and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd for going slow in a crucial communication project to construct 2,199 mobile towers in Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha. On many occasions, the Cobra had complained about the lack of communication network in forest areas. A major operation in Chhattisgarh, say commandos, was cancelled because they were unable to communicate with the headquarters from deep forest positions.
The need for better communication in Naxal-affected areas was felt more strongly after last year's Naxal attack in Chhattisgarh's Bastar district, in which 26 people, including senior Congress leaders, were killed. Many Cobra commandos have also complained about the poor quality of their infrared monoculars, which are essential for night operations.
Something is clearly wrong with the way the Cobras conduct operations and are commanded. Officials at the home ministry admit that the commandos are overstretched. The first two battalions were raised in 2008. Four more were raised in 2009 and another four in 2010. Instead of focusing on one area or state, about 10,000 personnel were deployed across vast areas in seven states. If that was not enough, a battalion was deployed in Assam to fight militants.
“There is little doubt that the Cobra is an extremely well-trained commando force,” said Dr Bibhu Prasad Routray, who was deputy director in the National Security Council Secretariat. “However, commandos do not come with a God-given gift to succeed. They need an enabling operating environment to be successful. [The] key component of such an environment is clearheaded policy, intelligence and leadership. On most occasions, there is an acute lack of all three components,” he said.
He compared Cobra commandos with the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh Police. “The latter have done exceedingly well in Andhra Pradesh, but have received setbacks in states like Odisha, where intelligence network of the police is comparatively poor,” said Routray.
To crush the Naxals, Andhra Pradesh adopted a well-coordinated model wherein the men on ground, such as the superintendent of police, had operational freedom. The State Intelligence Bureau, which has acquired sophisticated communication interception technology, gathers information about Naxal leaders and their activities, which is swiftly passed on to the cops. Such command structure and coordination is missing with the Cobras.
“Neither the Cobras nor the CRPF has interception capability,” said K. Srinivasan, former inspector-general of the Border Security Force who was hired by the CRPF in 2009 as consultant to raise its intelligence wing. “In other words, the success of our operations is completely dependent on the input we receive from other agencies.” According to him, building an intelligence network remains a top priority of the paramilitary forces to deal with internal security challenges. “Without precise and actionable intelligence, no commando operation can be successful,” said Srinivasan.
The initial plan was to set up the Cobra headquarters in Andhra Pradesh. Durga Prasad, who now heads the Special Protection Group, was keen to have the elite force stationed in the state, said the home ministry official who was part of the founding team. An anti-insurgency expert, Prasad had a reputation as an operations man. The idea behind having the force stationed in Andhra Pradesh was to facilitate better supervision and monitoring. But the headquarters was finally set up in Delhi. Soon, commandos were deployed across the states, in places far from district headquarters. Coordinating with the Cobra headquarters in Delhi became impossible. Deep inside Naxal areas, the commandos realised that they had to spend more time and energy to protect their own camps.
“After we raised the first two battalions and deployed them in Chhattisgarh and Odisha, our immediate challenge was to protect our base camps,” said former inspector-general of police K.V. Madhusudhanan, who served as the first deputy inspector-general of the Cobra. “It would have been a big embarrassment if our camps were attacked and looted by Naxals.” Despite all the challenges, he said, the CRPF raised a formidable special force. “The Cobras went to areas which were claimed by Naxals as liberated zones,” said Madhusudhanan. “We made some very good breakthroughs.”
But, as Maoist insurgency grew, so did the divisions in the government over how to confront it. The difference between states and the Central government was so visible that in early 2010, the so-called Operation Green Hunt against Naxals became a media spectacle.
The problem has also been that Naxals are distinct from other insurgent groups. As many as 80 per cent of Naxals are tribals and farmers. Armed Naxals form only 20 per cent and are not easy to identify. Even when enemy is identified the Cobra faces serious command structure problems.
Though a Delhi-based officer with the rank of inspector-general heads the Cobra, operations in every state are often led by the inspector-general of the CRPF, who does not function under the Cobra chief. The Cobra head, therefore, remains primarily an administrator. Another difficulty is that, under the Constitution, law and order is the responsibility of state governments. So the national policy for dealing with the Naxalites has been inconsistent.
The lack of coordination often results in terrible losses, such as the one on March 11, when Naxals ambushed a security patrol in a daring daytime attack in Sukma district in Chhattisgarh, killing 16 people, including 11 CRPF personnel. After the attack, H.S. Sidhu, CRPF inspector-general in Chhattisgarh, blamed the police for blocking a “massive operation” in Bastar that could have prevented it.
By 2011, it was clear that the command and control of the Cobra had to be revised to make it more effective. The guidelines of then CRPF director-general Vijay Kumar were clear: the Cobras will not conduct traditional police activities. Instead, their focus will be on gathering intelligence and conducting swift catch-and-kill operations. Kumar also instructed each company commander that instead of a 100-man team, the commandos should move in smaller groups.
To give a boost to his men, Kumar joined the Cobras in a major operation in Abhuj Maad in Chhattisgarh, a 4,000sq.km area which the Naxals had dubbed a liberated zone. He trekked the tough terrain and stayed with the men. “When we entered [the area], we were told that the last government official who visited Abhuj Maad did so some 25 years ago,” recalled a commando. “We broke the myth that nobody can challenge Naxals in Abhuj Maad. It was a great operation.”
The challenges of carrying out deep forest operations are many. For instance, in a major operation in the Saranda region in Jharkhand, nearly 400 CRPF and Cobra personnel contracted malaria. “It was like the plague,” said a CRPF officer. “Every second person in the battalion had malaria.”
The Cobras, however, were able to push out the Naxals from Saranda and many other areas of Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh. But things were virtually reversed in the past two years. With the security forces unable to hold captured areas, the Naxals re-emerged and spread out.
According to the latest assessment report by the Joint Intelligence Committee, trouble is now brewing in Bihar. In a hurried response, some 200 Cobra commandos were dispatched early this year. They would now have to decide whether to go after the Naxals or to protect politicians.
If past experiences are anything to go by, it is not an easy decision.
Muzzled menThe Commando Battalions for Resolute Action, commonly called Cobra, is a commando force formed in 2008 to tackle Naxal insurgency. At present, 10 battalions comprising 10,000 men are deployed across Naxal-hit areas in seven states. The Cobra has struggled to combat Naxals for several reasons.
Intelligence void: Despite having 35 intelligence personnel in every battalion, the Cobra has no intelligence network in place.
No cellphones: A crucial communication project to install 2,199 mobile towers in Naxal-affected states by June 2014 is hanging fire. Only 363 towers have been installed so far.
No interceptors: The Cobra wanted telecom interceptor capability to listen to Naxal communication. The Union home ministry, however, said no, saying Central intelligence agencies can share information with the force.
Parallel command: The Cobra chief functions primarily as an administrator. Operations are led by CRPF inspector-generals.
Over-stretched: With 10,000 commandos deployed in seven states, the Cobra is spread too thin.
Ill-used: Cobras were trained to fight Naxals, but many of them are doing traditional cop duties like patrolling streets.
Night blind: More than half of the infrared monoculars issued to the commandos don't work.
via The Week
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